Regular state unemployment insurance (UI) benefits are paid from state reserves held in unemployment trust fund accounts at the U.S. Treasury. Employers covered by the federal-state UI system make contributions to reserve accounts based on taxable wages. The federal government provides incentives for forward funding of benefits to support UI as an automatic macroeconomic stabilizer in the economy. However, the Great Recession exhausted UI reserves for the majority of states, and not all of them have yet replenished those reserves. Based on patterns observed over the past 40 years, in this paper we simulate the effects on state and systemwide reserves supposing that a mild, moderate, or severe recession emerges in the coming months. Our results suggest that even a moderate recession would cause a majority of states to exhaust UI reserves and be forced to borrow to pay regular UI benefits. We note that recent experience with federal funding of extended and emergency benefits may have contributed to the current state UI financing posture, and we suggest that the taxable wage bases are insufficient. The UI system exists to help involuntarily jobless Americans while they are between jobs. By accepted standards of adequacy, benefit provisions are not excessive, but limits in the financing system make it slow to recover from debt. State reserve funds have not yet reached levels sufficient to weather another economic storm.
term picture of the funding adequacy of the UI system by looking at the combined net UI system reserve ratio for all 53 programs. This net measure reduces balances for any Title XII borrowing, but it does not account for debt financed by state issuance of bonds and other loans.
The UI system reserve ratio was around 2 percent of total wages before both the 1991 and the 2001 recessions. During each of those recessions, more than a dozen states were forced to borrow, but the combined system stayed positive throughout those recessions. Before the Great Recession, however, system reserves were only 0.80 percent of total wages, and well more than half of all state UI systems went into debt during that crisis. As shown in Figure 1 Our approach to simulating impacts of future recessions on individual state reserve positions is to look at net reserves as a proportion of UI taxable wages (Figure 1 ). We focus on this ratio because the level of taxable wages drives reserve recovery for a given state tax 4 Total and taxable wages in Figures 1 and 2 structure. Reserve ratios defined on taxable wages are more volatile because the denominator in the ratio is only a fraction of total wages, yielding a ratio that varies more widely. Taxable wage bases, which determine the size of total taxable payrolls, vary across states and are an indicator of state attitudes toward the idea of forward funding UI benefits. The federal taxable wage base has been fixed at $7,000 per worker since 1983, and state taxable wage bases must be at least as high as the federal level. While only two states have UI-taxable wage bases equal to $7,000, many states have not strayed far above that level. More than half of all states (28) have taxable wage bases at or below double the federal level ($14,000). Figure 2 contrasts the federal UI taxable wage base (UITWB) with the Social Security taxable wage base (SSTWB). Both were originally set in 1936 to be $3,000, which at that time covered about 98 percent of all wages and salaries paid in the country. The SSTWB was increased five times between 1951 and 1971. In 1972, reforms included a plan for increasing and indexing the SSTWB. In 1982 the SSTWB indexing was refined, and in 2015 it reached $118,500. The UITWB has been increased only three times, in 1972, in 1978, and most recently in 1983 to $7,000 . The divergence between the SSTWB and UITWB is shown by the blue and red bars, respectively, in Figure 2 . The impact of the low UI taxable wage base on the ratio of taxable to total wages in UI-covered employment is shown by the dotted line graph in Figure 2 , which had a level of 0.98 in 1938 but had fallen to 0.27 by 2015. The capacity of the UI benefit financing system to generate revenues has fallen in step with the taxable-to-total wages ratio.
THE FORWARD FUNDING PRINCIPLE
For a state UI system to be sustainable over the long run, on average, revenues should match expenditures over business cycles. The accepted policy standard for UI benefit financing is based on the principle of forward funding. Having money in reserves when unemployment increases means states do not have to raise employer UI taxes immediately during recessions.
Therefore, forward funding prevents UI financing from driving the economy into a worse situation when business conditions are weak. Accumulating reserves during economic recoveries puts a slight damper on expansions but helps avoid severe financing crises in the depths of recessions. To achieve adequate forward funding, state accounts in the federal Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) should maintain balances "sufficient to pay at least one year of unemployment insurance benefits at levels comparable to its previous 'high cost '" (ACUC 1996, p. 11 As an incentive for states to maintain adequate forward funding of UI benefits, the new USDOL regulations set reserve requirements for states to maintain privileges for interest-free short-term loans. The rules require states to hold one year of reserves in the UTF equal to the average of the three highest benefit payment rates (benefit payments divided by total payrolls) experienced in the previous 20 years. This rate is known as the average high-cost rate (AHCR).
The new federal regulation required reserve balances to have a high-cost multiple (HCM) of 0.5 in 2014, increasing by 10 percentage points a year to reach 1.0 in 2019 and thereafter.
THE PAY-AS-YOU-GO ALTERNATIVE
An alternative to forward funding, which some states prefer, is pay-as-you-go financing of benefits. The fundamental principle of finance is that "money today is worth more than money tomorrow." By keeping employer UI taxes low, states may be reducing reserve balances, but they keep money in the hands of private-sector businesses, where jobs are created. In today's world of low interest rates, debt can be financed by tax-exempt state revenue bonds at interest rates far below the Title XII borrowing rates. Some states have adopted this model, which is a rational cost-saving approach in a low-interest-rate environment. Currently, interest rates on state revenue bond rates are about one-tenth the Title XII loan rates. However, this will not always be the case. When rates rise and the spreads between U.S. Treasury bonds and taxexempt state revenue bonds shrink or flip, forward funding will regain appeal. 6 Unfortunately, switching financing schemes in times of crisis can be very costly to states. Not only is forward funding a countercyclical stabilizer, it is a less risky policy option for states, since advance building of reserves is less risky than dealing with unexpected debt.
IMBALANCE BETWEEN BENEFIT PAYMENTS AND TAX REVENUES
Annual regular UI benefit payments totaled $30.5 billion in 2006 but reached a peak of $75.8 billion in 2009. Reserves along with current tax revenues were not sufficient to cover benefit payments over the duration of the Great Recession in most states. Systemwide Title XII borrowing totaled more than $141.3 billion from 2008 to 2012. In recent years the system has been tilting toward structural debt, as shown in Figure 3 . Over the 50-year period from 1966 to 2015, the percentage of taxable wages paid in UI-covered employment benefits averaged 2.54 percent, while the percentage of taxable wages paid in tax payments averaged 2.37 percent-a deficiency of 7.2 percent (Figure 3 ). 7 The imbalance between system disbursements and revenues worsened in the last half of that period. During the first 25 years, benefits averaged 1.8 percent more than tax contributions, while in the last 25 years, benefits averaged 12.2 percent more than tax contributions. As shares of taxable wages, there has been a downward shift over time in both benefit payments and tax contributions, but recently tax payments have fallen more.
This suggests both a declining rate of UI wage replacement and a declining capacity to finance even the lower benefit levels. 7 The ratio of benefits paid to total wages is called the benefit-cost rate. Ratios are based on actual data for UI benefits paid and tax contributions. Wage data for 2015 were estimated by multiplying actual 2014 wages by the year-over-year percentage change in wages for the first half of 2015 (wages for 2015Q1 plus 2015Q2 divided by wages for 2014Q1 plus 2014Q2).
The economic recovery that began in 1983 and continued through the 1990s resulted in a steady improvement in UI system reserves, which peaked at 2 percent of total wages and 5 percent of taxable wages in 1989. By 2000, after the early 1990s recession and healthy job gains in the late 1990s, but before the Y2K-dot-com bust, UI system reserves recovered to about 1.5 percent of total wages and 4.8 percent of taxable wages. With the relatively weak "jobless recovery" that followed, reserves reached only 0.8 percent of total wages and 2.9 percent of taxable wages before the Great Recession. Consequently, by 2010, system reserves had fallen to −0.67 percent of total wages and −2.48 percent of taxable wages. When the combined system is in a deficit position, net reserves are negative, and so is the reserve ratio. If the United States is to be adequately prepared to weather a future severe recession, these historical data suggest that prerecession reserves should be close to 2.0 percent of total wages or 5.0 percent of taxable wages. After several years of economic growth and labor market improvement, system net reserves had, by the end of 2015, recovered only to 0.67 percent of total wages and 2.53 percent of taxable wages. Carolina shortened the potential duration but also reduced the maximum weekly benefit amount from a formula-based $504 to a fixed $350, which will remain in effect until further legislative action. This change, effective July 1, 2013, ended federal EUC payments to more than 70,000
North Carolina UI beneficiaries and prevented others from receiving federally paid EUC through the end of 2013.
Effective in January 2012, Michigan permanently cut the maximum duration of regular UI benefits from 26 to 20 weeks. Georgia trimmed the maximum duration by the same amount, but varied it by linking it to the unemployment rate-that is, effective July 1, 2012, Georgia cut the maximum duration of benefits from 26 weeks to a range from 14 to 20 weeks, depending on the level of the unemployment rate. Florida adopted a similar variable maximum approach, with the potential duration falling to 12 weeks if the unemployment rate is at or below 5 percent.
Each 0.5 percentage-point increase above 5 percent adds one week to the maximum potential UI benefit duration in Florida, which peaks at 23 weeks for unemployment rates at or above 10.5 percent. In 2013, North Carolina adopted a variable maximum ranging from 12 to 20 weeks.
States may have been emboldened to shorten regular UI durations by the generous federal extensions. The federally funded extensions of UI in the Great Recession yielded potential durations of more than 26 weeks in all states and up to 99 weeks at times in some states. Figure   5 shows the share of total UI payments that were federally paid in recession years dating back to 2008-2009, 2001-2002, 1991-1992, 1980-1983 and 1974-1975 . For these five recessions, the peaks in business activity prior to the recession are designated as 2007, 2000, 1990, 1979, and 1973 . Subsequent to these peak years, for each state, we search for the minimum net reserve balance and use that value to define the trough. For each of the five recessions, the change in the reserve ratio is calculated by taking the change in the net reserve balance from peak to trough and dividing by peak-year taxable wages. These five values are then averaged. SOURCE: USDOL (2015, 2016) and authors' computations.
Figure 5 Federal Shares of Total Unemployment Insurance Benefit Costs in Recession Years

STATE BOND FINANCING
The statutory mechanism for financing state UI benefit payment debts is loans from the U.S. Treasury under Title XII of the Social Security Act. However, bond financing of UI debthas become increasingly popular among states. The six states listed in Table 2 Table 2 into consideration suggests four states are currently negative. 9 Figure 6 summarizes counts of states with negative net reserve positions along with simulation-based counts of states with negative net reserves after simulated recessions.
SIMULATIONS OF STATE BORROWING IN A NEAR-TERM RECESSION
Simulations of UI reserve balances experienced by states in mild, moderate, and severe recessions are based on the history from recessions in 2008-2009, 2001-2002, 1991-1992, 1980-1983, and 1974-1975 . For these five recessions, the preceding peaks in business activity were designated as 2007, 2000, 1990, 1979, and 1973, respectively . Subsequent to the peaks, we search for the minimum net reserve balance for each state and use that to define the reserve level in the following trough of the recession. For each of the five recessions, the change in the reserve ratio is calculated by taking the change in the net reserve balance from peak to trough and dividing by peak-year taxable wages. The dip in reserve ratio for an "average" recession is computed as the peak-to-trough drop in reserve ratio averaged over all five historical periods.
The dip for a "mild" recession is the average drop during the 2001-2002 and 1991-1992 recessions. The dip for a "severe" recession is computed as the average over the 2008-2009, 1980-1983, and 1974-1975 recessions. Simulations start with the official net reserve balances for each state at the end of 2015, adjusted for bond debt as the initial peak before a recession. The simulations examine reserve ratios defined by taxable wages. 10 Figure 6 summarizes the number of states that experience negative net reserves if a mild, moderate, or severe recession started in 2016. The simulations suggest that 21, 24, and 30 states would have negative net reserves, respectively, if a 2016 recession were mild, moderate, or severe. The count of 30 negative net reserve states is identical to the peak-year number of negative net reserve ratio states at the end of 2010, during the Great Recession.
It should be noted that our simulations are based entirely on historic patterns of changes in reserve ratios. The simulations include no adjustments for other factors that may have changed. In particular, there are no adjustments for changes in potential benefit durations or weekly benefit amounts. However, O'Leary (2012) reports that simulations based on cuts in benefit durations and amounts that have been implemented would reduce the countercyclical strength of UI benefit payments by up to two-thirds. This reduction in spending would most likely lengthen the duration of any future recession and delay and weaken any economic recovery that were to follow a recession. SOURCE: USDOL (2015) , sources listed for Table 2 , and authors' computations.
Another graphic representation of the simulation results is given in Figure 7 for each state should an average recession commence in 2016. Just 17 states are currently at or above their 2007 reserve ratio levels, and, under an average recession scenario, the UI system as a whole is underfunded and would again heavily rely on borrowing to finance benefit payments. Dollar amounts for reserve balances for each state, currently and under simulated recession scenarios, are listed in Table 3 , with associated reserve ratios listed in Table 4 .
CONCLUSION
Our simulation analysis suggests that current levels of UI system reserves are not high enough to avoid a net negative position for the system if a recession should emerge in the coming months. Even a relatively mild recession will generate debt for many states, and possibly for the whole system taken together. There is a structural mismatch in the system between benefit payments and tax revenues that has worsened in recent years. By accepted standards of adequacy, benefit levels and durations throughout the system are not excessive, but financing is inadequate.
From a negative net reserve position in 2012, UI system net reserves recovered to $24.1 billion by the end of 2015. However, this level is not sufficient to avoid systemic debt should a new recession emerge. Simulated mild and severe recessions suggest that net system debts of $13.5 and $40.4 billion, respectively, will result. During the Great Recession, systemwide indebtedness reached $30.7 billion in 2010. Our simulations suggest that systemwide reserves need to be at least 2.5 percent of 2015 taxable wages to avoid a systemwide debt following a mild recession, and that they need to be over 4.0 percent of taxable wages to avoid a systemwide negative reserve position should a severe recession occur.
16 SOURCE: USDOL (2015) , sources listed for Table 2 , and authors' computations. The inadequacy of forward funding for UI benefits has induced some states to reduce benefit durations, and in one case the maximum weekly benefit amount was reduced, too.
Forward funding of UI benefits helps improve the automatic countercyclical functioning of the UI benefit and tax system. If many states were to respond to the USDOL incentive of zero interest for short-term loans for maintaining year-end reserves at least at the average high cost rate, then individual state and overall system reserve adequacy would improve. Some states have adopted a pay-as-you-go UI benefit financing approach. This is a cost-saving strategy in the current low-interest-rate environment, but it could present systemic risks and have procyclical effects should interest rates rise. A hindrance to adequate UI benefit system finance is the low federal taxable wage base.
The federal-state UI system was established during the Great Depression by the Social Security Act of 1935. The taxable wage base is the foundation for adequate forward funding of UI benefits. The $7,000 federal taxable wage base, which was equal to the Social Security taxable wage base when the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) was enacted, is now less than 6 percent of the Social Security level. The FUTA wage base sets the minimum taxable wage standard for states, and 90 percent of FUTA taxes are returned to the states to pay regular benefits. The 10 percent of FUTA revenues retained by the federal partner forms the basis for funding public employment services, state administration of UI programs, and the federal reserve for loans to states. Boosting the FUTA tax base would nudge states to improve forward funding of benefits, restore the reemployment emphasis of UI programs, and support better information technology and skilled staffing for state program administration.
